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Abstract
Empirical studies examining responses to new product en-
tries come to the puzzling conclusion that, in general, an in-
cumbent reacts to a new entrant after a signiﬁcant delay.
Even easy-to-implement price cuts are observed after signiﬁ-
cant lag following entry. These ﬁndings seem to contradict
the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or
strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit
competitive encroachment. When a competing ﬁrm enters
the market, consumers may be uncertain about the entering
ﬁrm’s product quality. The incumbent ﬁrm (through rigor-
ous tests) may fully know the entrant’s quality. Suppose the
incumbent aggressively lowers price. This may cause the
consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant’s quality is high.
In other words, an incumbent’s reaction may cause the con-
sumers to make inferences about the entrant’s quality. Such
strategic implications of the incumbent’s reactions have tobe
carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response
by the incumbent.
In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for un-
derstanding differences in the magnitude and timing of in-
cumbents’ responses to competitive entries. We consider a
model in which a monopolist incumbent ﬁrm faces compet-
itive entry. The incumbent ﬁrm knows the true quality of the
entrant with certainty. Although consumers are aware of the
incumbent’s product quality through their prior experience,
they are initially uncertain of the entrant’s product quality.
In such a situation, a high-quality entrant has the incentive
to signal her true quality through her strategic price choice.
However, the uncertainty about the entrant’s quality is fa-
vorable to the incumbent in the sense that consumers believe
with a high probability that the entrant’s quality is low. As
a result, the strategic incentives facing the incumbentandthe
entrant oppose each other. While the entrant wants to signal
her high quality, the incumbent wants to prevent her from
doing so. We demonstrate that one way the incumbent can
prevent the quality signaling is to select a higher than his
optimal competitive (duopoly) price. In other words, the in-
cumbent can prevent or “jam” the entrant’s quality signaling
by choosing a price higher than his optimalcompetitiveprice
when consumers are fully informed about the entrant’s true
quality. Though the signal-jamming price is lower than the
monopoly price, the price is substantially higher than the
competitive price. This marginal reduction in the incum-
bent’s price from the pre-entry monopolistic price represents
a muted or lack of response by the incumbent to the com-
petitive entry. However, once the entrant’s quality gets re-
vealed in subsequent periods through consumer usage and
word of mouth, the entrant has no incentive to engage in
quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam
it. Therefore, the market reverts to the complete-information
competitive prices, and the incumbent lowers his price con-
siderably. This temporal pattern of muted price reduction in
the ﬁrst period followed by a sharp price reduction in the
second period corresponds to a delayed defensive reaction
in our model. Although the empirical studies suggest that
the delayed reaction may arise due to factors such as man-
agerial inertia or indecision, we demonstrate that such a be-
havior is indeed an optimal strategy for a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm. Thus, our model reconciles empirical results with the
equilibrium outcome of a strategic analytical framework.
Furthermore, in an experimental setting, we test the pre-
dictive power of our framework and establish that consum-
ers indeed form conjectures about the entrant’s qualitybased
on the incumbent’s reactions. In the ﬁrst experimentalstudy,
we ﬁnd strong support for the notion that the incumbent’s
price reaction may indicate entrant’s quality. In a follow-up
study, we observe that whenever the incumbent lowers
prices, respondents judge the quality of the entrant to be
higher as compared to the case when prices are the same or
increased. The managerial implication of this paper is that
well-established incumbent ﬁrms should be cautious in the
implementation of their defensive responses to product in-
troductions ofuncertainqualitybycompetitors.Ofparticular
concern are situations where the reactions are easily observ-
able by consumers. A strong reaction may suggest that the
incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously, leading
consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor’s
product.
(New Product Entry; Defensive Reaction; Quality Signaling;
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1. Introduction
Competitive reaction to entry has received consider-
able attention in the marketing and economics areas.
As entry intensiﬁescompetition,incumbentﬁrmsmust
lower prices in response to entry. The following an-
ecdotal evidence exempliﬁes this expectation:
In 1975, Bristol-Myers introduced Datril, an acetaminophen
(non-aspirin) analgesic, to the market. The major player in the
nonprescription analgesic market then was Tylenol, which
was produced and marketed by McNeil Labs, a subsidiary of
Johnson and Johnson. Datril was introduced as a low-priced
alternative to Tylenol. Two weeks before Datril’s introduc-
tion, McNeil Labs responded by reducing the price of Tylenol
to the trade by 30%. In addition, in 1975, McNeil Labs in-
creased their advertising budget to promote Tylenol from an
estimated $2 million in 1974 to $8 million.
Observe that the incumbent, which was the dominant
ﬁrm in the pre-entry period, responded to the new
competitive threat immediately. Interestingly, how-
ever, incumbents often do not respond immediately.
Consider the following anecdote that buttresses this
point:
Gatorade, introduced in 1966, is the major player in the sports
drink market. In 1991, it held a 86.6% market share (Beverage
World 1992). The ﬁrst set of competitors includedSuntoryWa-
ter Group’s 10-K, which entered in 1986, Powerburst in 1989,
and Pepsi’s Mountain Dew Sport (later changed to All Sport)
in 1990 (Supermarket News 1990). Despite these new entrants
that were lower priced, Gatorade maintained high price lev-
els. In 1990 Coca-Cola introduced PowerAde nationwide
through fountains and subsequently in cans and bottles. The
defensive response to the new competitors was made in 1993
when Gatorade engaged in price wars with PowerAde
(BrandWeek July 12, 1993).
Surprisingly, this delayed reaction is not an isolated
example and, in fact, is a widely observed strategy. In
a study based on theStrategic PlanningInstitute’s(SPI)
start-up business data pertaining to 199 new product
entries, Robinson (1988) observed a pattern of delayed
responses by the incumbent ﬁrms. In particular, defen-
sive price reactions, which are the easiest to imple-
ment, are also often delayed. Similarly, Bowman and
Gatignon (1995) also observed delayed responses in
the PIMS database. They note that in 28.7% of the
cases, the defensive responses to new product entries
occurred after more than a year; in 18% of the cases, it
occurred between six months and a year; and in only
13.4% of the cases was there an immediate defensive
response. Given such contrasting patterns of defensive
response by the incumbent, the following questions
naturally arise: Why do some incumbents choose to
respond immediately to the competitive threat while
others elect to delay their responses? What are the in-
stitutional features and strategic considerations that
prompt incumbents to delay their defensive reactions?
We set out to examine these issues here.
Economic theory would suggest that competitive re-
sponses occur because, in the pre-entry period, the in-
cumbent is a de facto monopolist and hence sets mo-
nopoly proﬁt-maximizing prices. However, after the
new product entry, the market structure changes to a
more competitive situation that leads an incumbent
ﬁrm to reduce his price so as to limit competitive en-
croachment. This observed pattern of decrease in the
incumbent’s prices in the post-entry period relative to
the pre-entry period can be conceptualized as defensive
response by the incumbent.
1.1. A Brief Overview of the Model, Main Results,
and Intuition
We consider a stylized model in which there is an in-
cumbentﬁrm that facescompetitiveentry.
1Consumers
in the market are aware of the incumbent’s quality by
virtue of buying its product in the past. However, they
are uncertain of the entrant’s quality. (The literature
on pioneering advantage suggests the uncertainty re-
lated to the later entrant’s quality as a rationale for
ﬁrst-mover advantage; see Schmalensee (1978) and
Robinson and Fornell (1985) for additional insights.)In
contrast, the incumbent through reverse engineering
and market research, can correctly gauge the quality
of the entrant. Clearly, such a strategy is too costly for
any individual customer.
What should the entrant do when consumersareun-
certain of her
2 quality? For exposition, consumer un-
certainty can be thought of as if the consumers were
facing either a low-quality entrant or a high-quality
1Our focus is on the nature of price competition in the post-entry
period. Thus, we abstract away from strategic considerations facing
the incumbent in the pre-entry period such as entry deterrence and
limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Srinivasan 1991).
2For ease of exposition, we refer to the incumbent as “he” and the
entrant as “she.”KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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entrant, but they are not sure. The credible signaling
strategy of the high-quality entrant is to separate her-
self from a possible “ghost” low-quality entrant. Es-
sentially, the high-quality entrant must select a strat-
egy such that it is too costly for any low-cost entrant
to select the same strategy to imitate and hide her low
quality. (In fact, the low-quality entrant prefers to se-
lect an optimal strategy, even if her low quality is re-
vealed, rather than imitate.) When such different strat-
egies would be adopted by the high- and low-quality
entrants, consumers, on observing the entrant’s strat-
egy, must correctly infer whether the entrant quality is
high or low. The literature in the quality-signalingarea
suggests that a high-quality entrant should raise prices
to signal higher quality (Bagwell and Riordan 1991;
Milgrom and Roberts 1986). The reasoning is that if the
entrant’squality and hencecostofproductionarehigh,
any decrease in volume due to higher prices would
hurt the low-quality entrant with a lower cost more
than the high-quality entrant. Therefore, at sufﬁciently
high prices, the low-quality incumbent would prefer
to select a optimal low price and be known as the low-
quality entrant instead of imitating the high price to
avoid revelation of low quality. Consequently, when a
high price is observed, consumers must correctly infer
that the entrant’s quality is high.
These signaling strategies have been studied in the
context of a monopolist ﬁrm attempting to inform un-
certain consumers. What sets our analysis apart from
these studies is that we are considering a competitive
market with an incumbent offering a product of
known quality. In this context, consider a high-quality
entrant competing with the incumbent and facing un-
certain consumers. As before, the entrant would try to
select a high price to signal high quality. Note that
while consumer uncertainty is unfavorable for the
high-quality entrant, it is favorable for the incumbent
who knows the entrant’s high quality. Therefore, the
incumbent’s and the entrant’s incentives oppose each
other. While the entrant wants to signal her high qual-
ity, the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so.
One way the incumbent can prevent the quality signal
is to select higher than optimal duopoly price (that is,
higher than duopoly prices that are much lower than
the monopoly prices). By doing so, the high-quality
entrant is forced to raise prices even higher to signal
quality. More important, as we demonstrate in this pa-
per, the efﬁciency of higher price as a signal decreases
with increasing price of the incumbent. Consequently,
the entrant’s ability to signal declines when the incum-
bent raises the price. In fact, the incumbent through
higher price selection can prevent or “jam” the entrant
from engaging in quality signaling. We reiterate that
the duopoly prices are much lower than the monopoly
prices. Thus, even when the incumbent selectsahigher
than duopoly price to jam the entrant’s signal, hisprice
is below the monopoly price. This marginal price re-
duction represents a muted or lack of price response
to the entry. Once the entrant is in the market place,
her quality would get revealed over time as consumers
buy the product and use it. (Note that even when the
quality signal is jammed, the entrant achieves positive
sales.) After the quality of the entrant is eventually
learned, the entrant has no incentive to engage in qual-
ity signaling and the incumbent hasnoincentivetojam
it. Therefore, the market reverts to the informed duo-
polistic competition, and thus the incumbent lowers
his price considerably. This temporal pattern of muted
price reduction in the ﬁrst period followed by sharp
price reduction in the second period represents the
prediction of delayed reaction in our model.
We believe that even to the reader less familiar with
the signaling analysis and logic, our model offers a
compelling intuition. At the risk of being somewhat
imprecise, when the incumbent aggressively reacts to
competitive entry by sharply lowering his price, con-
sumers may wonder if theentrant’sproductissuperior
or better. This notion constitutes the genesis of our
analysis. Apart from a rigorous analytical formulation
deriving this intuition, we also subject it to experimen-
tal tests. The experimental veriﬁcation is not an elab-
orate test of the model; rather, it aims to assesswhether
the central premise of the model has any face validity.
In the ﬁrst experimental study, from a number of com-
peting explanations for delayed reaction, respondents
chose our intuition as the most important reason. In a
second experiment, we closely examine the underpin-
nings of our model explanations. Our results support
the notion that when the incumbent lowers price, re-
spondents expect the entrant’s quality to be high and
vice versa.
We recognize that the incumbent, besides pricing,KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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can utilize other elements of the marketing-mix ele-
ments to respond to the competitive threat. For in-
stance, in the context of product strategy this could
entail either repositioning the existing products on the
quality dimension (Hauser andShugan1983)orbroad-
ening the product line(s) by introducing newproducts.
Such strategic considerations have an intrinsic time di-
mension and thus can be considered as delayed reac-
tion. Yet it is unclear as to why immediate price reac-
tion (that can be modiﬁed before responding with
other marketing-mix elements) is still not an optimal
strategy.
1.2. Managerial Implications
The genesis of the explanation offered in this paper is
a direct outcome of class discussions with executives
for the Harvard case “Deere & Co.: Industrial Equip-
ment Operations.” In this case, Deereentersthemarket
segment of heavy bulldozers with claims of superior
quality. The technology behind the product improve-
ment is untested and hence there is uncertainty about
the reliability of this technology. While identifying the
defensive reactions by the incumbent ﬁrm, Caterpillar,
several participants are usually concerned about the
potential inference by the contractors (customers)
about Deere’s product if Caterpillar lowers the price.
Another example also underscores this point. The ag-
gressive price and non-price response by Pepsi to an
entry by Coke into its segment has led to the conclu-
sion, “All thecounterattackingbyPepsilegitimizedthe
(Coke) product” (Wall Street Journal 1990).
The timing of competitive response, therefore, has
signiﬁcant strategic implications. In the context of our
analysis, we ﬁnd that when consumers are uncertain
about the entrant’s quality, the incumbent ﬁrm must
be careful in deciding the optimal response to entry.
Given that the incumbent’s ability to test and identify
the quality of a product far exceeds that of any indi-
vidual consumer, it is reasonable for consumers to ex-
pect that ﬁrms are aware of each other’s quality. Any
aggressive attempt by theincumbentﬁrmmayleadthe
customers to view the incumbent’s strong defensive
reactions as an implicit acknowledgment of the com-
petitor’s strength in the marketplace. In fact, such be-
liefs may enhance theattractivenessofthecompetitor’s
product.
The incumbent’s defensive strategies, given the
above consideration, will vary depending on whether
or not such strategies are easily observable by the con-
sumers. For example, price and advertising responses
are more visible to consumers as compared to trade
promotions. Thus, a ﬁrm that aims to respond vigor-
ously and immediately but does not want consumers
to view the entrant’s product favorably may select dis-
creet alternatives such as trade promotion and sales-
force incentives.
The conceptual framework that we propose and the
strategic considerations impacting on the incumbent’s
timing of defensive response that we highlight are of
particular managerial relevance in those cases when
the entrant’s reputation for delivering high quality is
nonexistent or weak. When a new ﬁrm with limited or
no prior track record enters a market, the quality un-
certainty is likely to exist. Such uncertainty may also
be prevalent even for established ﬁrms when they en-
ter new segments or when they adopt new technolo-
gies. In these markets, incumbent ﬁrms will have to
examine the optimal timing of their defensive
reactions.
1.3. Related Literature
Defensive strategies by incumbent ﬁrms to new com-
petitive threats have received considerable attentionin
the literature. While the literature has focused primar-
ily on the direction (Hauser and Shugan 1983), inten-
sity (Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen 1989), and scope
(Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985) of the incumbent’s re-
sponses, a few empirical studies in marketing have ex-
amined the timing of competitive response to new
product introductions (Bowman and Gatignon 1995;
Robinson 1988). As mentioned earlier, the empirical
ﬁndings have indicated a variety of responses and par-
ticularly delayed responses by the incumbent ﬁrms
(Biggadike 1979; Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Chen,
Smith, and Grimm 1992; MacMillan, McCaffery, and
Van Wijk 1985; Robinson 1988). This empirical ﬁnding
of delayed response is contradictory to the normative
literature (Hauser and Shugan 1983; Kumar and
Sudarshan 1988; Porter 1985) that either implicitly as-
sumes immediate response (or is silent on the timing
issue) or explicitly advocates immediateresponses.ForKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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example, Porter (1985, p. 498) recommends that “as a
general rule, quick and vigorous retaliation is
necessary.”
The contradiction between the normative models
and the empirical ﬁndings has led to conjectures in the
literature to account for this discrepancy. For instance,
Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen (1989) ascribe the
lack of initial reactions by incumbent ﬁrms to their “in-
ability to respond effectively.” They argue that ﬁrms
may be uncertain about the best way to respond to
competitive actions or may lack the managerial exper-
tise to do so. Extending this argument, Bowman and
Gatignon (1995) hypothesize that ﬁrms operating in
relatively more stable market environments may be in-
efﬁcient in processing competitive information and
thus delay responses as compared to ﬁrms operating
in unstable environments. Though it is plausible that
managerial inefﬁciency or indecision is likely to cause
delay in response by the incumbent, it is hard to claim
that all delays are likely to be caused by managerial
ineptitude or indecisiveness. Another conjecture by
Bowman and Gatignon (1995) is that an incumbent’s
reaction will be faster in a market with a high growth
rate. In such rapidly growing markets, possible capac-
ity constraints may suggest delayed rather than im-
mediate reaction. Also, low growth markets become a
zero-sum game arena. In these markets, incumbents
may react immediately to retain their market share.
More important, for these conjectures, it is unclear as
to why delayed reaction emerges as the optimal strat-
egy for a proﬁt-maximizing incumbent.
3
In any event, our experimental study provides a
measure of direct comparison of the relative impor-
tance of the various explanations. The explanation that
consumers may infer the entrant’s quality based on the
incumbent’s reaction is viewed as the most likely rea-
son. While the usual caveats of interpreting experi-
mental results are readily applicable, at a minimum,
3In a market where consumers face switching cost (Klemperer 1987),
an incumbent ﬁrm’s incentive to respond immediately is somewhat
mitigated since the switching cost limits the competitive encroach-
ment by the entrant. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing
out this reason. We show that even when switching cost is absent,
delayed reaction may be an optimal strategy due to signaling con-
siderations.
the ﬁnding underscores the importance of the expla-
nation developed in this paper.
2. The Model
In this section, we lay out the model formulation and
discuss the main assumptions. In § 2.1, we characterize
the consumer behavior assumed in our analysis. In §
2.2, we derive the demand functions facing the incum-
bent and the entrant.
2.1. Consumer Model
Let qI be the quality of the incumbent’s product and let
qE be the quality of the entrant’s product. We assume
that even though all consumers value higher levels of
quality, they are heterogeneous in their willingness to
pay for incremental quality. We capture this aspect of
consumer heterogeneity by assuming that the mar-
ginal willingness to pay for quality, ], is distributed
uniformly over the interval [0,1]. Consumers purchase
at most one unit of the product in any time period.
Consumer purchase decision is dictated by the stan-
dard utility maximization framework. Thus, a con-
sumer will purchase the product (either the incum-
bent’s or the entrant’s) whenever the expected value of
the product exceeds the market price and will select
the brand (either theincumbent’sortheentrant’sprod-
uct) that yields the highest surplus.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that consumers
differ in their valuation of quality. Let the set of poten-
tial consumers correspond to the interval [0,1] with a
uniform distribution and total mass N. Without any
loss of generality, we normalize the mass of potential
consumers to be unity, i.e., we set N 4 1. In the fol-
lowing analysis, we assume that the net surplus to the
consumer located at h for a good of quality q at price
p is given by u(q, p|h) 4 hq 1 p. This speciﬁcation of
consumer surplus function is similar to those used in
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Moorthy (1988), Bagwell
and Riordan (1991), and Moorthy and Srinivasan
(1995).
4
4This implicitly assumes consumer risk neutrality and has been
made for analytical simplicity. If consumers were risk averse, the H-
type entrant would have a higher incentive to signal while the L-
type entrant would have a higher mimicking incentive. Thus, if the
incumbent were to signal-jam, he would have to distort his prices
up even further. This would mean even more “muted” initial reac-
tion, thereby accentuating the phenomena of delayed defensive re-
action. We thank an anonymous reviewer foralertingustothisissue.KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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2.2. Demand Functions for the Incumbent and the
Entrant
Consider the demand for a product of quality q at price
p when only one brand is available (as is the case in
the pre-entry period when the incumbent, ﬁrm I, is the
monopolist). The set of consumers who will buy the
product is of the form [h*, 1] where h* 4 min {h:0#
h # 1, hq 1 p $ 0}. Hence, in the pre-entry period, the
demand facing the incumbent, when he is the monop-
olist, is given by (p) 4 1 1 (p/qI), where the su-
PE DI
perscript PE refers to the pre-entry market structure.
However, when more than one quality is offered in
the market (as is the case following the entry of the
entrant ﬁrm, ﬁrm E), an individual consumer has to
decide not only whether to buy at all but also select
between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s products.
In this case, we need to ascertain that consumer pur-
chase decision satisﬁes two key constraints. The ﬁrst
condition is the Individual Rationality (IR) or partici-
pation constraint, which requires that for a consumer
to purchase the product, he/she must derive a non-
negative surplus. The second condition is the Incentive
Compatibility (IC) or self-selection constraint, which
requires that if a consumer selects a product among
various alternatives, it must be that he/she derives the
highest surplus from the selected alternative.
Consider ﬁrst the case of an incumbent offering
quality qI (at price pI) and the entrant offering quality
qE (at price pE) when the incumbent’s product is of su-
perior quality, i.e., qI . qE. It is obvious that for the
entrant to have a nonzero market share, it is necessary
that the entrant’s price be less than the incumbent’s,
i.e., pE , pI. However, the condition pE , pI alone is
not sufﬁcient to ensure that the entrant will enjoy a
nonzero market share. When qI/pI $ qE/pE (i.e., “qual-
ity per dollar” is higher for the incumbent’s product),
all consumers h [ [0,1] prefer the incumbent’s product
to the entrant’s product, provided they purchase any
product because
hqI (hq 1 p ) 1 (hq 1 p ) 4 p 1 1 II EE I 12 pI
hq hq EE 1 p 1 1 $ (p 1 p ) 1 1 EI E 12 12 pp EE
qq IE $ 0 {{ $ . 12 { pp IE
In this case, the demand for the incumbent’s product
is DI(pI, pE) 4 1 1 (pI/qI) and the demand for the en-
trant’s low-quality product is zero. Now, consider the
case when the entrant’s product is not dominated, i.e.,
qE , qI, pE , pI, and qI/pI , qE/pE. In this case, the set
of consumers who purchase the incumbent’s product
is of the form [h***, 1], where
h*** 4 min {h:0# h # 1, hq 1 p $ 0, II
hq 1 p $ hq 1 p }, II EE
while the set of consumers purchasing entrant’s prod-
uct is of the form [h**, h***] with 0 , h** , h*** , 1
and
h** 4 min {h:0# h # 1, hq 1 p $ 0}, EE
and the set of potential consumers who do not buy the
product at all is [0, h**]. Note that the IC constraint is
trivially satisﬁed for the buyers of the entrant’s prod-
uct. Thus, the demand functions facing the incumbent
and the entrant with qualities qE , qI are given by
Equations (T1.1) and (T1.2) in Table 1.
Now consider the case when the entrant’s product
is of superior quality. In this case, for the incumbent
to have a nonzero market share, it must be that pE .
pI and qI/pI . qE/pE.
5 Under these conditions, the de-
mand functions facing the incumbent and the entrant
are given by Equations (T1.3) and (T1.4) in Table 1.
5In our analysis, we make the routine assumption that the cost of
quality function is convex. We further assume that this relationship
is sufﬁciently convex such that the quality per unit price is higher
for the lower quality product.KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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In the above discussion, we have assumed that the
quality of the entrant’s product is known to the con-
sumers. However, immediately following the entry of
ﬁrm E, consumers may be uncertain about the en-
trant’s quality. Let q [ [0,1] be the prior probability
that the true quality of the entrant is high and let 1 1
q [ [0,1] be the probability that the entrant’s quality is
low.
6 In this situation, the demand facing the entrant
(and the incumbent) would depend on the consumers’
beliefs about the entrant’s quality q ˜E rather than the
entrant’s true quality qE and hence the demand func-
tions for theincumbentandtheentrantcanbeobtained
by substituting q ˜E for qE in the above demand
functions.
Observe that the demand function facing the en-
trant, DE(.,.) (both when qE , qI, Equation (T1.2), and
when qE . qI, Equation (T1.4)), is increasing in the per-
ceived quality qE of the entrant’s product. This sug-
gests that when the entrant’s quality is uncertain, a
high-quality entrant stands to gain (through demand
enhancement) by favorably changing the quality per-
ception of her product. This provides the necessary in-
centive for quality signaling by a high-quality entrant,
provided she can credibly do so and signaling is not
prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, the demand
function facing the incumbent, DI(.,.) (both when qE ,
qI, Equation (T1.1), and when qE . qI, Equation (T1.3)),
is decreasing in theperceivedqualityqEoftheentrant’s
product so that any favorable change in the entrant’s
perceived quality hurts the incumbent. Thus, if the in-
cumbent, through his strategic choice of marketing-
mix variables, can increase the cost of quality signaling
by a high-quality entrant, he would optimally do so.
This provides the intuition behind the “signal-
jamming” effort by an incumbent who knows the
“true” high quality of the entrant in the face of (im-
plicit) quality-signaling threat from a high-quality en-
trant. We summarize the above observation on the im-
plications of entrant’s perceived product quality onthe
6Consumers’ priors may arise from their experience from related
products: For example, consumers can base their expectationson the
possible quality levels of computer monitors from televisions, of fax
machines from photocopying machines, etc.
incumbent’s and entrant’s demand in the following
lemma:
7
Lemma 1. The demand for the entrant’s product is in-
creasing in the (perceived) quality of the entrant’s product,
qE, while the demand for the incumbent’s product is decreas-
ing in qE, i.e., ]DE/]qE . 0, and ]DI/]qE , 0.
3. Analysis
In § 3.1, we ﬁrst describe the optimal pricing strategies
of the incumbent and the entrant ﬁrmwhenconsumers
are aware of the quality of the entrant’s product. The
analysis serves to characterize the optimal “defensive
reaction” of the incumbent ﬁrm when signal jamming
is not a key strategic consideration. In § 3.2, we relax
the assumption that consumers know the entrant’s
quality and analyze the implications for the optimal
pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant us-
ing a two-period model. We assume that consumers
are uncertain about the entrant’s product at the begin-
ning of the ﬁrst period (i.e., immediately following the
entry of the new ﬁrm) while the quality of the entrant
gets revealed over time (i.e., at the beginning of the
second period). Our analysis shows that, under con-
ditions of incomplete information about the entrant’s
quality, it may be optimal for the incumbent to delay
his reaction. In this case, the adjustment in the incum-
bent’s pricing strategy from the pre-entry to the post-
entry levels does not occur immediately but rather
over an extended time frame. This temporal pattern of
incumbent’s price underlies the notion of delayed
(price) reaction.
3.1. Equilibrium Analysis When the Entrant’s
Quality Is Known
In the pre-entry period, the incumbent ﬁrm is a mo-
nopolist and as such charges a price that maximizes
his proﬁt. Since the focus of our analysis is to study
the defensive reaction of the incumbent following the
entry of a new ﬁrm, we assume that limit pricing
(Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Srinivasan 1991) is not an
7Proof of all the lemmas and the propositions are given in the ap-
pendix.KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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Table 2 Competitive Pricing Strategies of the Entrant and the
Incumbent Under Complete Information (Programs P1 and
P2)
Parametric
Condition Competitive Pricing Strategies
qI . qE Incumbent’s Pricing Problem
p 1 p IE P1 : p* [ argmax P(p, p ) [ (p 1 c)1 1 II I E I I 34 q 1 q p IE I
(T2.1)
Entrant’s Pricing Problem
qp 1 qp EI IE P18 : p* [ argmax P (p, p ) [ (p 1 c ) EE I E E E 34 q (q 1 q ) p EI E E
(T2.2)
qE . qI Incumbent’s Pricing Problem
qp 1 qp IE EI P2 : p* [ argmax P(p, p ) [ (p 1 c) II I E I I 34 q(q 1 q) p IE I I
(T2.3)
Entrant’s Pricing Problem
P 1 p EI P28 : p* [ argmax P (p, p ) [ (p 1 c )1 1 EE I E E E 34 q 1 q p EI E
(T2.4)
issue and hence ﬁrm I cannot deter entry.
8 The follow-
ing lemma characterizes the optimal pre-entry price of
the incumbent ﬁrm:
Lemma 2. The optimal pricing strategy of ﬁrm I (in-
cumbent) in the pre-entry period when he is a monopolist is
given by 4 (qI ` cI)/2, where the superscript PE refers
PE pI
to the pre-entry market structure and cI is his marginalcost.
In the post-entry period, however, is no longer the
PE pI
optimal pricing strategy for ﬁrm I due to the funda-
mental change in the market structure. The equilib-
rium prices of the incumbent and the entrant ﬁrms in
the post-entry period will critically depend on the rela-
tive qualities of the entrant’s and the incumbent’s
product. Let qI and qE be the qualities of the incum-
bent’s and the entrant’s products and let cI and cE be
their respective marginal costs. Then, the following
two situations may arise: (a) entrant’s product is of in-
ferior quality, i.e., qI . qE, and (b) entrant’s product is
of superior quality, i.e., qI , qE.
First, we consider the case when the incumbent’s
product is of superior quality. The pricing problem
faced by the incumbent, for any given price of the en-
trant, pE, can be formulated as Program P1 given in
Table 2 (Equation (T2.1)).
Thus, the reaction function of the incumbent while
competing against an entrant with an inferior product
is given by
R (p ) [ 2p 1 q ` q 1 p 1 c 4 0. (1) I I IIEEI
Note that the incumbent’s reaction function RI({)i si n -
creasing in the entrant’s price, pE, i.e.,
]R ({) ]p II [. 0. (2)
]p ]p EE
Since both the entrant and the incumbent select their
duopoly prices simultaneously, the entrant faces a
similar situation. The pricing problem faced by the en-
trant, for any given price set by the incumbent, pI, can
8This implicitly assumes that the cost structure of the incumbent is
known to ﬁrm E before making the entry decision. This isreasonable
because from the pre-entry pricing strategy of the incumbent ﬁrm,
the entrant can infer the marginal cost of the incumbent. In the ab-
sence of asymmetric information on the marginal cost of the incum-
bent, limit pricing in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and
Srinivasan (1991) is not an equilibrium outcome.
be similarly formulated as Program P18 given in Table
2 (Equation (T2.2)).
Thus, the reaction function of the entrant while com-
peting against an incumbent with a superior product
is given by
R (p ) [ 2qp 1 qp1 cq4 0. (3) EE I E E I E I
It is easy to show that the entrant’s reaction function
RE({) is increasing in the incumbent’s price as well as
increasing in the entrant’s quality and marginal cost,
i.e.,
]R ({) ]p ]R ({) ]p EE EE [. 0; [. 0,
]p ]p ]q ]q II E E
and
]R ({) ]p EE [. 0. (4)
]c ]c EE
Equations (2) and (4) reﬂect the fact that under
Bertrand competition, the reaction functions are up-
ward sloping, implying that pricing strategies of the
incumbent and the entrant are strategic complements
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1984; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and
Klemperer 1985).
9 The Nash-equilibrium prices of the
9We thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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Table 3 Equilibrium Prices of the Entrant and the Incumbent Under
Complete Information
Parametric
Condition Equilibrium’s Pricing Strategies
qI . qE Incumbent’s Price




q (q 1 q ) ` cq ` 2cq EI E I E E I p* 4 E 4q 1 q IE
(T3.2)
qE . qI Incumbent’s Price
2qc ` q(q 1 q ` c ) EI I E I E p* 4 I 4q 1 q EI
(T3.3)
Entrant’s Price
2q (q 1 q) ` q (2c ` c) EE I E E I p* 4 E 4q 1 q EI
(T3.4)
incumbent and entrant are a pair of prices that simul-
taneously satisfy the incumbent’s and the entrant’s re-
action functions. The following proposition character-
izes the optimal pricing strategies of the incumbent
and the entrant when the incumbent’s product is
superior:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium post-entry prices for
the incumbent and the entrant when the consumers know
the entrant’s true quality and the incumbent’s product is of
superior quality areasgivenbyEquations(T3.1)and(T3.2),
respectively, in Table 3.
Now, consider the case when the entrant’s product is
of superior quality. In this case, the optimal pricing
strategies faced by the incumbent and the entrant can
be modeled as Programs P2 and P28 given in Table 2
(Equations (T2.3) and (T2.4), respectively).
As in the previous case, it can be shown that when
qI , qE the reaction functions for the incumbent and
the entrant are given by
R (p ) [ 2qp1 qp 1 cq 4 0, (5) IE E I I E I E
and
R (p ) [ 2p 1 q ` q 1 p 1 c 4 0, (6) E I EEIIE
respectively. It can befurthershownthatthesereaction
functions are upward sloping in the competitive price.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal
pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant
when the entrant’s product is superior:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium post-entry prices for
the incumbent and the entrant when the consumers know
the entrant’s true quality and the entrant’s product is of
superior quality areasgivenbyEquations(T3.3)and(T3.4),
respectively, in Table 3.
As the following proposition demonstrates, theincum-
bent’s optimal price in the post-entry period is always
lower than in the pre-entry period regardless of
whether he faces an entrant with a superior product or
an entrant with an inferior product:
Proposition 3. The optimal defensive strategy for the
incumbent following the entry of a new ﬁrm, when consum-
ers know the quality of the entrant’s product, is to imme-
diately reduce his price to the optimal duopoly price. The
post-entry price of the incumbent is lower than his pre-entry
price, i.e., . .
PE pp * II
Proposition 3 implies that when consumers know the
entrant’s quality with certainty, the incumbent’s reac-
tion will be immediate. Once the incumbent has ad-
justed his pricing strategy from the pre-entry monop-
oly level to the post-entry duopoly level, he would
have no incentive to change his pricing strategy. Thus,
when the entrant’s quality is known, a delayed price
response from the incumbent is not optimal.
3.2. Equilibrium Analysis When the Entrant’s
Quality Is Uncertain
We now consider the more general case of post-entry
price competition between the incumbent and the en-
trant when consumers are uncertain about the en-
trant’s quality. This is a reasonable assumption, espe-
cially when the ﬁrm sponsoring the new product is not
a reputed ﬁrm. Consumers know the quality of the in-
cumbent’s product, qI, through their prior experience
with that product. We, however, assume that the in-
cumbent is aware of the true quality of the entrant’s
product. The rationale for our assumption about the
asymmetry across consumers and the incumbent re-
garding the entrant’s quality is as follows: Recall that
the attribute characterizing the product in quality-sig-
naling literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Bagwell
and Riordan 1991; Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995) isKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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conceptualized as an experience attribute, i.e., that di-
mension of a product’s quality that cannot be ascer-
tained prior to purchase/consumption. However, the
consumer learns the true level of the attribute through
consumption experience. Our analysis rests on the no-
tion that the incumbent ﬁrm can ascertain the true
quality of the entrant’s product easily through me-
chanical testing or reverse engineering. Doing so,how-
ever, is prohibitively costly for an individual
consumer.
To capture the consumer uncertainty regarding the
entrant’s quality, we assume that qE [ { , }, where
HL qq EE
denotes the quality of the entrant’s product if the
H qE
entrant is a high-quality ﬁrm and denotes the qual-
L qE
ity of the entrant’s product if she is a low-quality
ﬁrm.
10 We further assume that .. 0. Let q [
HL qq EE
[0,1] be the prior probability that the true quality of the
entrant is high and 1 1 q [ [0,1] be the probability
that the entrant’s quality is low. We assume that the
quality of the entrant gets revealed at the beginning of
Period 2 provided some consumers buy the entrant’s
product in Period 1.
11 Consistent with prior signaling
literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Moorthy and
Srinivasan 1995), we assume that .. 0,
12 where
HL cc EE
and are the marginal costs of the high-quality and
HL cc EE
10In reality, consumer uncertainty regarding the entrant’s quality
will be manifested through qE belonging to a range [qE, q ¯E] with 0 ,
qE , q ¯E. Consistent with the signaling literature, for analytical sim-
plicity, we capture uncertainty by hypothesizing that qE [ {,} .
HL qq EE
11Our assumption that the entrant’s quality gets fully revealed at the
beginning of Period 2, while consistent with extant quality-signaling
literature (MilgromandRoberts1986;MoorthyandSrinivasan1995),
is clearly an abstraction of reality. Note that in these two-period
stylized models, time period needs to be interpreted in an informa-
tional sense rather than a temporal sense. Further, if in our model,
entrant’s quality were to be gradually revealed over time through
word of mouth in the spirit of Bagwell and Riordan (1991), we con-
jecture that this would imply that the incumbent’s price, instead of
dropping instantaneously in Period 2 in the current formulation,
would converge more gradually to the full-information duopoly
level. This would observationally imply further “delay” in the in-
cumbent’s defensive response. We thank an anonymous reviewer
for alerting us to this issue.
12The basic idea behind this assumption of perfect correlation be-
tween quality and cost is that higher quality entails higher cost of
production. This implicitly assumes that lower quality of the entrant
is not attributable to technological inefﬁciencies. We thank anony-
mous reviewers for suggesting clariﬁcation on this issue.
low-quality entrants, respectively. For notational con-
venience, we shall refer to the high-quality entrant as
the H-type entrant and the low-quality entrant as the
L-type entrant.
Our analysis under asymmetric information about
the entrant’s quality underscores the following issues:
As in the monopoly case (Wolinsky 1983; Bagwell and
Riordan 1991; Bagwell 1991), the H-type entrant can
signal her high quality by distorting her initial post-
entry price upwards in the duopoly case as well. How-
ever, unlike in the previous cases, the incumbent who
knows the “true” quality of the entrant can manipulate
the signaling cost of the H-type entrant by distorting
his initial post-entry prices upwards. Thus, under cer-
tain parametric conditions, the incumbent can increase
the H-type entrant’s signaling cost. In fact, when the
H-type entrant’s signaling cost is sufﬁciently raised,
the entrant’s attempt to signal quality may no longer
be optimal. We call such equilibrium the signal-jam-
ming (SJ) equilibrium.
13 Because of signal jamming, the
initial post-entry price of the incumbent is higher than
the (long-term) equilibrium duopoly levels. After the
entrant’s quality gets revealedthroughwordofmouth,
the incumbent reduces his prices to the duopoly levels.
We interpret this temporal pattern of incumbent’s
price wherein the incumbent “reacts” to competition
gradually over time as ‘delayed’ defensive response.
We obtain these results by employing the sequential
equilibrium concept (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Essen-
tially, the concept requires that (a) each type of entrant
ﬁrm selects her optimal pricing strategies, given opti-
mal action on the part of the incumbent ﬁrm and the
consumers; (b) the incumbent selects his optimal pric-
ing strategy, given optimal type-contingent strategies
of the entrant ﬁrm and optimal strategies of the con-
sumers; (c) individual consumers make optimal buy/
no buy decisions given the optimal pricing strategies
of the H-type and L-type entrant ﬁrms and the incum-
bent ﬁrm and given their beliefs about the entrant’s
13Note that this deﬁnition of signal-jamming is somewhat different
from that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Unlike in their case, the
signal-jamming action (incumbent’s ﬁrst-period pricing) is observ-
able (though, in SJ equilibrium, it is not informative since his prices
are the same whether it is the H-type or the L-type entrant). It is
similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) in the sense that signal jam-
ming interferes with the inference problem faced by the uninformed
player (entrant in their model, consumers in this model).KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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type; and (d) wherever possible, consumers update
their beliefs about the entrant’s type using Bayes’ rule.
In the following analysis, we restrict our attention to
equilibria arising from pure strategies. Thefocusofour
analysis is on the so-called separating and pooling se-
quential equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, the
ﬁrst-period pricing strategies of the two types of the
entrant differ and, therefore, consumers can correctly
infer the entrant’s quality. On theotherhand,inapool-
ing equilibrium, the ﬁrst-period pricing strategies of
the H-type and the L-type entrants are the same and,
therefore, consumer posterior belief is the same as the
prior belief. Note that the Bayesian updating allows
arbitrary beliefs for out-of-equilibrium paths, raising
the possibility of a multiplicity of equilibria (Tirole
1988). We employ the reﬁnement of “elimination of
dominated strategies” (Moulin 1979) and the“intuitive
criterion” (Cho and Kreps 1987) to eliminatesequential
equilibria supported by implausible out-of-
equilibrium beliefs.
3.2.1. Quality Uncertainty and Strategic Consid-
erations of the Entrant and the Incumbent. Unlike
the case when the entrant’s quality is known with cer-
tainty, the strategic considerations facing the entrant
and the incumbent are more involved. We discussnext
the incentive for the high-quality entrant to engage in
quality signaling and the conditions under which such
signaling is possible (i.e., in technical terms, conditions
for satisfaction of Spence-Mirrlees “single-crossing”
property). We then discuss the incentive for theincum-
bent to engage in signal jammingandconditionsunder
which this is possible.
3.2.1.1. Entrant’s Incentive and Ability to SignalQuality
in Duopoly. When consumers a priori are uncertain
about the quality of the entrant’s product, they base
the purchase decision on qI and the expected quality
of the entrant’s product, q ˜E [ .
14Since
HL qq ` (1 1 q)q EE
. q ˜E, a high-quality entrant stands to gain by re-
H qE
vealing her “true” higher quality. In the following
proposition, we summarize this result, which provides
14This simpliﬁcation in the derivation of realized demand for the
incumbent’s and the entrant’s products is due to the assumption of
consumers’ risk-neutrality. If consumers were risk averse, demand
uncertainty will reduce the entrant’s demand even further, thereby
increasing the gains accruing to a high-quality entrant from quality
signaling. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
the requisite incentive for the high-quality entrant to
engage in quality signaling.
Proposition 4. The optimal proﬁt of the high-quality
entrant is increasing in her perceived quality given the price
of the incumbent, i.e., /]q ˜E . 0.
H ]P * E
However, since both the high- and low-quality en-
trants stand to gain from favorable consumer beliefs,
a mere assertion of superior quality will be discounted
by rational consumers and hence cannot serve as a
credible signal of high quality.
15 The H-type entrant
can convey her superior quality by increasing, for any
given price pI of the incumbent, her ﬁrst-period price
above her optimal price under complete information.
The basic intuition is as follows: Recall that the mar-
ginal cost of the H-type entrant is higher than that of
the L-type entrant, i.e., . As such, under con-
HL c . c EE
sumer uncertainty about the entrant’s quality so that
the price charged by the H- and the L-type is the same
(being consistent with q ˜E), for any price pE selected by
the entrant, the per unit contribution margin is higher
for the L-type entrant than for the H-type entrant.
Therefore, the opportunity cost of a loss in sales is
higher for the L-type entrant. Thus, to deter mimicking
from a possible L-type, the H-type entrant distorts the
ﬁrst-period prices to a higher level so as to limit the
sales in the ﬁrst period.
16 Our analysis suggests that
the intuition behind higher price as a signal of higher
quality is valid even under duopolistic market condi-
tions. We formally demonstrate this result in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 5. For any given price of the incumbent,
pI, the marginal losses resulting from any marginal upward
price distortion are greater for the L-type entrant than for
the H-type entrant. Therefore, for prices above the optimal
price of the H-type entrant under complete information, the
15Note that in our stylized product market, there is only one entrant:
either a H-type entrant or a L-type entrant. However, since consum-
ers a priori do not know the entrant’s true quality, theH-typeentrant
has to select an appropriate pricing strategy to credibly convince the
uncertain consumers that she indeed is a H-type entrant.
16Intuitively, the L-type entrant would want to adopt the strategy of
a ﬂy-by-night operator of selling as many units as possible before
her true low quality gets revealed. Thus, to achieve a separation, the
H-type entrant adopts the costly strategy of selling less than her
complete information quantity by charging a higher price.KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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L-type entrant incurs greater lossesthantheH-typeentrant,
i.e.,
LL HH ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) E EIE E EIE $ 1 @ ]p ]p EE
H* for " p $ p , (7) EE
where is the H-type entrant’s optimal price when the
H* pE
entrant’s quality is known with certainty.
The implication of Proposition 5 is that by distorting
her price, pE, “sufﬁciently” above the complete infor-
mation price level, , the high-quality entrant can
H p * E
deter mimicking from a “ghost” low-quality entrant.
Thus, in the resulting separating equilibrium, the two
types of entrants follow different pricing strategies.
Therefore, by observing a “high” price, rational con-
sumers correctly infer that the entrant’s quality is high.
3.2.1.2. Incumbent’s Incentive and Ability to Signal Jam.
The key difference in the entrant’s quality signaling
strategy between monopoly and duopoly is note-
worthy. Under duopoly, the high-quality entrant’s
marginal ability to separate from the “ghost” low-
quality entrant depends on the pricing strategy of the
incumbent. Essentially, the incumbent can “sufﬁ-
ciently” increase the high-quality entrant’s cost of
quality signaling such that quality signaling is too ex-
pensive to undertake. Recall, that the incumbent ﬁrm
knows the entrant’s true quality. Further, the incum-
bent recognizes the signaling incentive on the part of
the H-type entrant. It is important to note that when
consumers recognize a high-quality entrant correctly,
the incumbent’s proﬁt is lower. Therefore, the incum-
bent has an incentive to prevent the entrant from cred-
ibly signaling her quality.
Proposition 6. The proﬁt of the incumbent is decreas-
ing in the perceived quality of the entrant given the price of
the entrant, i.e., ({)/]q ˜E , 0. ]P* I
The signaling cost borne by the H-type entrant de-
pends on the H-type’s marginal ability to separate,
which is deﬁned as the ratio of /]pE to /]pE.
LH ]P ]P EE
If, through his pricing strategy, the incumbent can re-
duce the H-type entrant’s marginal ability to separate,
the incumbent can increase the signaling cost of the H-
type entrant, thereby making quality signaling more
difﬁcult. (As we note in the following proposition, the
H-type entrant’s marginal ability to separate is de-
creasing in the incumbent’s prices.)
Proposition 7. The high-quality entrant’s marginal
ability to separate decreases as the incumbent’s price
increases.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: The ratio
of the slopes of the L-type entrant to the H-type entrant
decreases as the H-type entrant’s price increases. As
noted earlier, since pricing strategies of the incumbent
and the entrant are strategic complements (Fudenberg
and Tirole 1984; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer
1985), the H-type entrant’s prices are increasing in the
incumbent’s prices. By distorting his prices upward,
the incumbent raises the H-type entrant’s price
(through the competitive effect), thereby reducing the
H-type entrant’s marginal ability to separate from the
L-type entrant.
Proposition 8. The low-quality entrant’s incentive to
mimic the high-quality entrant increases as the incumbent’s
price increases.
Note that Proposition 7 suggests that the H-type en-
trant’s ability to separate is reduced by upward price
distortion by the incumbent. Moreover, Proposition 8
states that the L-type entrant enjoys greater incentive
to pool with the H-type entrant. When taken together,
these results clearly underscore the incentive for the
incumbent to engage in signal jamming. The incum-
bent does it by selecting a price sufﬁciently high such
that separation for the entrant is so costly that she pre-
fers to pool. Clearly, the existence of such a signal-
jamming equilibrium will depend upon certain para-
metric conditions. As will become evident from the
next section, the signal-jamming equilibriumpricesare
complex expressions and, therefore, we are unable to
express the condition in a tractable way. We rely on
numerical simulations to verify existence of signal-
jamming equilibrium over a range of parameter
values.
Note that the incumbent facing a true L-type entrant
may want to signal the entrant’s type to consumers.
However, the incumbent cannot credibly do so by
choosing a price higher than the signal jamming price.
The reason is that the marginal losses to the incumbentKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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Table 4 Quality-Signaling Pricing Strategy of the High-Quality
Entrant Under Incomplete Information (Program P3)
P3:
HH qp 1 qp EI IE QS HH H H H p [ argmax P (p, p ) [ (p 1 c ) H EE I E E E 34 HH q (q 1 q ) p EI E E
(T4.1)
subject to
HH qp 1 qp EI IE L,H H L P (p) [ (p 1 c ) 2 EI E E 34 HH q (q 1 q ) EI E
.
LL ,* qp 1 qp (p) EI IE I L,* L L,L # [p (p) 1 c ] 2 [ P (p) EI E EI 34 LL q (q 1 q ) EI E
Table 5 Signal-Jamming Pricing Strategy of the Incumbent Under
Incomplete Information (Program P3*)
P3*:
p 1 p IE SJ p [ argmax P(p, p ) [ (p 1 c)1 1 II I E I I 34 q 1 ˜ q P IE I
(T5.1)
subject to
QS HH qp1 qp (p) EI IE I QS H,H H H P (p) [ (p (p) 1 c ) EI EI E 34 HH q (q 1 q ) EI E
H,q ˜ qp 1 qp (p) EI IE I H,q HH , q # (p (p) 1 c ) [ P (p). EI E EI 34 ˜ q (q 1 ˜ q ) EI E
(T5.2)
from such an upward price distortion are the same for
both types of entrants.
3.2.2. Quality Uncertainty, Signal Jamming, and
Delayed Defensive Reaction. Essentially, the in-
cumbent signal jams the quality-signaling effortsofthe
H-type entrant by distorting his ﬁrst-period price
above his complete-information duopoly price. In the
second period, however, the quality of the entrant gets
revealed provided the entrant enjoys nonzero sales in
the ﬁrst period.
17 Therefore, the incumbent’s prices
converge to the equilibrium duopoly prices. We inter-
pret this temporal pattern of the incumbent’s price re-
sponse occurring in the second period (instead of im-
mediately following entry) as the empiricallyobserved
phenomenon of delayed reaction by the incumbent in
the face of competitive entry.
3.2.3. Characterization of the Signal-Jamming
Equilibrium. In this section, we characterize the op-
timal pricing strategies for the incumbent and the H-
and L-type entrants under the condition
H q . q . IE
. Note that under this parametric condition, the in-
L qE
cumbent’s quality is superior totheentrant’sperceived
quality, i.e., qI . q ˜E. The logic for the case .
HL q . q EE
qI is similar and, for brevity, we omit the analytical
details.
Before we offer details of our analysis, we describe
the logic behind our approach. First, in Program P3
(Table 4), we obtain the reaction function of the H-type
entrant to any given price of the incumbent when the
H-type entrant attempts to achieve least-cost separa-
tion. Subsequently, in Program P38 (Table 5),wederive
the incumbent’s signal-jamming reaction function for
any given price of the entrant. Moreover, the reaction
function satisﬁes the constraint that the H-type entrant
weakly prefers the pooling outcome to engaging in
17In this paper, we do not consider the case when the incumbent,
through manipulating his ﬁrst-period price, can completely block
out the entrant, i.e., the entrant has zero sales in the ﬁrst period (as
also in subsequent periods since the entrant’s true high qualitynever
gets revealed). If indeed zero sales for the entrant (i.e., entrant’s exit
from the market) were to occur in equilibrium, then entry of ﬁrm E
in the ﬁrst period cannot be an optimal strategy. Furthermore, such
predatory pricing by the incumbent is illegal under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Alternatively, we can assume that in Period 2, the
entrant’s quality is always known with certainty.
quality signaling. The pair of prices obtained by si-
multaneously satisfying the two reaction functions
constitute the signal-jamming equilibrium.
In Figure 1, we graphically represent the signal-
jamming equilibrium. The curves in this ﬁgure repre-
sent the reaction functions of the incumbent and en-
trant, identiﬁed by appropriate subscripts, for the
various informational scenarios. (pI)( (pI)) rep-
H,* L,* RR EE
resents the high-quality (low-quality) entrant’s reac-
tion function under complete information(obtainedby
substituting ( ) and ( ) for qE and cE, respec-
HL H L qq c c EE E E
tively, in Equation (3)). (pI) represents the H-type
H,q RE
entrant’s reaction function consistent with prior beliefs
(obtained by substituting q ˜E and for qE and cE, re-
H cE
spectively, in Equation (3)). (pI) represents the re-
QS RE
action function for the high-type entrant correspond-
ing to least-cost separation (see Lemma 3; Equation
(8)). (pE) represents the incumbent’s reaction func- R* I
tion when it refrains from signal jamming (cf.Equation
(1)). Finally, (pE) is the incumbent’s reaction func-
SJ RI
tion under signal jamming (see Lemma 4; Equation
(11)).KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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Figure 1 Schematic Representation of the Complete Information and Asymmetric Information Equilibria
3.2.3.1. Optimal Pricing Strategy of the High-Quality
Entrant Under Quality Signaling. We ﬁrst consider the
reaction function of the H-type entrant when she en-
gages in signaling her high quality through upward
distortion of the ﬁrst-period price. Let pI be any given
price of the incumbent. Then, the pricing problem
faced by the H-type entrant, given pI, when she at-
tempts to credibly signal her quality can be modeled
as Program P3 in Table 4.
The logic behind the program formulation P3 is as
follows: Constraint (T4.2) denotes the mimicking con-
straint for the L-type entrant. The left-hand side of
Equation (T4.2) represents the L-type’s proﬁt, given pI,
when she mimics the H-type’s pricing strategy and,
under the most favorable consumer beliefs, she is mis-
taken to be the H-type entrant (see Moorthy and
Srinivasan (1995) for additional discussion on the issue
of formulating the L-type’s mimicking constraint). We
denote this proﬁt by (pI) where the ﬁrst super-
L,H PE
script denotes the L-type entrant’s true type, while the
second superscript denotes consumer beliefs about the
L-type under mimicking. The rationale behind taking
the price of the incumbent, pI, as given is the Nash
assumption of zero conjectural variation (Iwata 1974;
Bresnahan 1987). The right-hand side of Equation
(T4.2) represents the L-type’s proﬁt, for any given pI,
when she selects her complete-information price and
consumers correctly infer her low quality, i.e., . We
L qE
denote this proﬁt since both the entrant’s true
L,L PE
(ﬁrst superscript) and the perceived (second super-
script) quality type is the L type.
Lemma 3. The optimal pricing strategy of the H-type,
given pI, when she attempts to signal her high quality (at
the least-cost signaling) is given by
HH L pq (1 ` l ) ` q (c ` l c ) QS IE 1 IE 1 E H p (p ) 4 , (8) EI 2q (1 ` l ) I 1
where l1 [ (11, 0) is given byKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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l 41 1 ` I
HL 2 HH HH H L 2 HL (qp1 cq) ` (qp` cq )(cq1 qp ) 1 2ccq` 2pqq c EI E I EI EI EI EI EE I I I EE . HL 2 HH ! (qp1 cq) 1 4kq q (q 1 q ) EI E I EI I E
(9)
Note that lI, which essentially reﬂects the “tightness”
of the IC constraint of the L-type entrant, denotes the
extent of distortion in the H-type’s price required for
credible quality separation (for any given price of the
incumbent, pI). Thus, lI 4 0 corresponds to the case
when the mimicking constraint is non-binding so that
theH-type entrant canachievequalityseparationwith-
out any distortion. An immediate implication of Equa-
tion (9) is that ]lI/]pI , 0, which implies that the sig-
naling cost borne by the H-type entrant is increasing
in the incumbent’s price (or, equivalently, the IC con-
straint of the L-type entrant is “tighter”). Therefore,the
incumbent can raise his price in order to make quality
signaling more expensive for the high-quality entrant.
Furthermore, it can be shown that the H-type entrant’s
reaction function under quality signaling (as given by
Equation (8)) is steeper than that under complete in-
formation (as given by Equation (3)). Thus, for any
given price of the incumbent, pI, the H-type entrant
selects a higher price under quality signaling. This re-
sult is consistent with the upward price distortion ob-
tained in the literature under monopoly conditions
(e.g., Wolinsky 1983; Bagwell and Riordan 1991;
Bagwell 1991; Judd and Riordan 1994). We summarize
these insights in the following lemma:
Lemma 4. The higher the incumbent’s price, pI, the
greater in the extent of distortion in the H-type entrant’s
price needed for credible quality signaling, i.e., ]lI/]pI , 0.
Furthermore, the H-type entrant’s reaction function is
steeper under quality signaling than under complete
information
QS HH ,* ]p ]p EE 1 [
]p ]p II
HH L 2 HL qq (c 1 c )[ pq 1 qc] IE E E IE IE
22 2 HH L H H L 3/2 2(1 ` l ){pq 1 2pq qc ` q [4kq (q 1 q ) ` qc ]} 1 I E IE IE I E E I IE
. 0. (10)
Thus, for any given incumbent’s price, pI, the H-type en-
trant selects a higher price under quality signaling than un-
der complete information.
3.2.3.2. Optimal Pricing Strategy of the Incumbent Un-
der Signal Jamming. When the incumbent engages in
signal jamming, for any given entrant’s price pE, the
strategic consideration facing the incumbent is not
only to maximize his proﬁt but also to select a price
“high enough” to deter quality signaling by the H-type
entrant. The incumbent’s pricing problem when he at-
tempts to jam the entrant’s quality signaling can be
modeled as Program P38 given in Table 5.
In Equation (T5.2), (pI) refers to the H-type en-
H,q pE
trant’s reaction function when consumers believe her
quality to be q ˜E and is obtained from Equation (3) (by
substituting q ˜E for qE and for cE). (pI)i st h eH-
QS H H cp E E
type entrant’s quality-signaling reaction and is given
by Equation (8). Constraint (T5.2) is the IC constraint
for the H-type entrant, which requires that the H-type
entrant prefers to “pool” with the L-type entrant by
following the pricing strategy (pI) rather than to
H,q pE
reveal her high quality by engaging in quality-
signaling pricing strategy (pI). We denotetheproﬁt
QS H pE
of the H-type entrant under pooling by (pI); the H-
H,q PE
type’s proﬁt when her high quality gets revealed is
denoted by (pI).
H,H PE
Note that in the above program we do not need to
impose an additional constraint to ensure that the in-
cumbent prefers signal jamming even when he knows
that the entrant is the L type. The reasoning is as fol-
lows: Any low-quality entrant not only realizes the
high-quality entrant’s incentive to separate but also re-
alizes the incumbent’s incentive to signal jam such a
separation. Suppose the incumbent did not engage in
signal jamming, realizing the entrant’s quality to be
low. In that case, the low-quality entrant will mimic
the high-quality entrant’s optimal price, avoiding sep-
aration, and force the incumbent to the signal-jamming
price to create weak defection to the ﬁrst best. In other
words, signal jamming by the incumbent makes sep-
aration by the high-type costlier but makes mimicking
by the L-type more attractive.
18
18An alternative way of gleaning the intuition as to why the incum-
bent will not defect from the signal-jamming equilibriumevenwhen
he faces a L-type entrant is stated in the spirit of the forward induc-
tion in Cho andKreps(1987). TheL-typeentrantmakesthefollowing
statement to the incumbent: “I know that you will try to prevent the
H-type entrant from signaling quality by choosing signal-jamming
prices. Therefore, the only way the H-type entrant can signal qualityKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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The following lemma characterizes the incumbent’s
reaction function under signal jamming:
Lemma 5. The optimal pricing strategy of the incum-
bent, for any given price of the entrant, when the incumbent
attempts to jam quality signaling is given by
H 2p 1 c ` q ˜ 1 c 1 q IE EII
HH q (q 1 q ˜ ) c EI E E H 1 l ` p `4 0. (11) 2 E 3 H 4 2q (q 1 q )2 II E
The following proposition characterizes the signal-
jamming equilibrium:
Proposition 9. In the signal-jamming equilibrium,
the optimal prices of the incumbent andtheentrantaregiven
by the simultaneous solution to Equations (8) and (11). In
such a pooling equilibrium, both the H- and the L-type en-
trants select the same price and consumers’ posterior beliefs
coincide with their prior beliefs. Furthermore,theincumbent
selects the same price, irrespective of the entrant’s quality
type. This perfect Bayesian equilibrium is supported by the
following out-of-equilibrium beliefs pI ? Þ q 4 1 and
SJ pI
pE ? Þ q 4 0, which satisfy the intuitive criterion.
SJ pE
Note that in the signal-jamming equilibrium, both the
H-type and the L-type entrants follow the same pricing
strategies. In other words, the H-type entrant “pools”
with the L-type entrant. Since both the H-type and the
L-type entrants follow the same strategy, the pricing
strategy of the incumbent is also not contingent on the
quality type of the competing entrant ﬁrm. Further,
observe that both the entrant and theincumbentfollow
the same pricing strategies, regardless of whether the
entrant is the H type or the L type. Hence, onobserving
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s prices, the consum-
ers cannot rationally infer the entrant’s “true” quality.
Therefore, consumers’ posterior beliefs coincide with
their priors.
3.3. Numerical Example
We illustrate the delayed reaction with a numerical ex-
ample. Let the quality of the incumbent product, qI,b e
200, the quality of the H-type entrant ( ) be 175, and
H qE
is by selecting a price higher than the signal-jamming price. I exploit
your desire to signal jam by mimicking any price equal to or lower
than the signal-jamming price of the H-type entrant.”
that of the L-type entrant ( ) be 100. Furthermore,con-
L qE
sumers are pessimistic about the entrant’s quality with
prior probability, q, of 0.05 that the entrant’s quality is
high. Note that such beliefs provide the incentive for
the H-type entrant to engage in quality signaling. The
marginal cost of the incumbent, cI, is 30, while those of
the H-( )a n dL-type ( ) entrants are 18 and 5, re-
HL cc EE
spectively. Under these parametric conditions, thepre-
entry monopoly price of the incumbent ( ) is 115,
PE pI
while under duopoly the incumbent’s price when en-
trant’s quality is known with certainty in Period 2 ( ) p* I
is 40.96. The incumbent’s price in Period 1 to jam the
entrant’s quality signal ( ) is 112.05. We also note that
SJ pI
the incumbent’s proﬁt under signal jammingimproves
by 55% over the case when the incumbent allows the
entrant to signal quality. Thus, the sequence of the ob-
served price of the incumbent is 115 (pre-entry), 112.05
(signal jamming), and 40.96 (complete information). In
this example, of the total decrease in the incumbent’s
price of 74.04, only 4% of the price decrease occurs
immediately after entry while 96% of the decrease oc-
curs after entrant’s quality becomes known.
We repeated the numerical simulation for a large set
of values for the parameters of the model. We ﬁnd that
in most cases, a signal-jamming equilibrium exists. We
ﬁnd that the incumbent’s price path, consistent with
the phenomenon of delayed response, is quite robust.
4. Experimental Validation
The observational implication of the model is that the
optimal strategy of the incumbent may be a delayed
defensive response. As discussed earlier, most of the
empirical studies in the literature ﬁnd signiﬁcantdelay
in defensive reactions (Robinson 1988; Bowman and
Gatignon 1995), which can be viewed as conﬁrming
our model predictions. Even though the empirical
studies are not inconsistent, they do not constitute a
“test” of the theory in the strict sense of the term. For
instance, in the existing data sets (e.g., PIMS) we do
not know the extent of consumer uncertainty of the
quality of the new product. Neither the cost structure
of the incumbent or entrant is known and no data are
available on the temporal pattern of the revelation of
the entrant’s quality information. These difﬁculties are
not unique to our model. In fact, any rigorous testingKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
Response to Competitive Entry
396 Marketing Science/Vol. 17, No. 4, 1998
Table 6 Results from Experiment 1
Possible Explanations for Delayed Response
Mean Likelihood
(Standard Deviation)
(i) There is incumbent inertia—They react slowly. 21.58 (14.01)
(ii) Market growth rate is high. 32.07 (19.61)
(iii) Reaction may indicate entrant’s quality. 70.24 (21.72)
(iv) Entrant is not viewed as a threat. 37.32 (17.21)
(v) Market is not important to the incumbent. 26.71 (15.88)
(vi) Incumbent’s capacity utilization is high. 51.70 (15.41)
(vi) Customer switching costs are high. 52.79 (19.12)
of any theory based on asymmetric information faces
the same set of limitations.
In an attempt to test the proposed theory, we con-
ducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, we tested
for the plausibility of the rationale proposed in this
paper.
19 In addition, Experiment 1 also compared the
proposed explanation with the competing explana-
tions proposed in the literature. Given the data limi-
tations, the appropriate way to test our model was to
begin by testing (a) the face validity of the model and
(b) by comparing the explanatory “power” for the pro-
posed explanation relative to others. We did this by
providing decision makers with information about
consumers’ quality uncertainty and the timing of qual-
ity revelation. The respondents were asked to conjec-
ture about the most likely explanation accounting for
a ﬁrm’s delayed response. Speciﬁcally, we tested our
explanation relative to the explanations proposed by
Robinson (1988) and Bowman and Gatignon (1995).
Experiment 2 constituted a more direct test of the be-
havioral underpinning of our model.
4.1. Experiment 1
Subjects. The subjects were 81 full-time MBA and
evening MBA students enrolled in a marketing com-
munications class at a private university on the East
Coast. The years of work experience of the subjects
ranged from three to six years. Subjects were asked to
take part in a marketing decision study. They were
asked to read a scenario that describedadecisionmade
by a ﬁrm and then were given a list of potential post
hoc reasons as to why the decision was made by the
ﬁrm. Subjectswereaskedtoindicatethelikelihoodthat
the decision was made for the explanations provided
to them.
Subjects were told that a ﬁrm Oldpro, a subsidiary
of Consolidated Industries, was in the business of
manufacturing and selling heavy diesel engines. Old-
pro was an established and well-respected ﬁrm. Ayear
ago, a ﬁrm Gamma entered the diesel engine market
and introduced a new product to compete againstOld-
pro. Further, subjects were informed that Gamma’s
19We thank the acting editor, Rajiv Lal, for suggesting this experi-
ment. Though this experiment was not the ﬁrst conducted chrono-
logically, we report it as Experiment 1 for logical consistency.
product was superior in quality relative to Oldpro’s
product. Oldpro had to make a decision on how to
respond to Gamma’s introduction. Subjects were then
told that Oldpro decided not to respond immediately
to Gamma’s new launch—they waited for one year
and then reduced their prices.
Subjects were provided with a total of seven expla-
nations, six of which were hypothesized in the litera-
ture as explanations for delayed competitiveresponses
(Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Robinson 1988). Subjects
were instructed to read all the explanations before re-
sponding to the question “How likely is it that Old-
pro’s management made the decision for the reason
listed?” on a 100-point scale anchored between not at
all likely to very likely. The explanations in the order
given to the subjects were: (i) There is inertia in Old-
pro’s management—they respond slowly; (ii)Themar-
ket is growing at a very high rate; (iii) If Oldpro im-
mediately reduced their prices, customers would infer
that Gamma’s product was of high quality; (iv) Oldpro
does nor perceive Gamma to be a threat; (v) The diesel
engine market is not very important to Consolidated;
(vi) Oldpro’s capacity utilization is high; and (vii) It is
very expensive for customers to switch to the new
technology.
Results and Discussions. Table 6 summarizes the
means and standard deviations of the responsesforthe
seven explanations provided to the subjects. As can be
seen, the subjects judged the delayed reaction of re-
ducing prices by the incumbent to have occurred most
likely because an immediate reaction would have in-
dicated the entrant’s quality to the consumers. The
only other statistically signiﬁcant explanations for theKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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Table 7 Results from Experiment 2
Entrant’s Mean Quality Rating
(Standard Deviation)
Incumbent’s Price-Based
Defensive Reaction Graduate Subjects Undergraduate Subjects
(i) Price decrease 65.36 (14.61) 64.04 (16.47)
(ii) No price change 52.80 (4.07) 53.72 (5.83)
(iii) Price increase 47.24 (15.32) 46.66 (15.91)
delayed reaction by the incumbent were those related
to consumer switching costs and the incumbent’s high
capacity utilization. We believe that these results pro-
vide strong evidence that the proposed explanation
has high face validity relative to the alternative expla-
nations provided in the literature. Furthermore, the
“explanatory power” of the proposed theory was
found to be satisfactory.
4.2. Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we tested for the face validity of the
proposed model. In addition, we demonstrated that,
relative to the competing explanations in the literature,
the proposed explanation for delayed responses by the
incumbent was observed to be the most intuitively ap-
pealing. As a further veriﬁcation of the theory, in this
experiment we tested a behavioral assumption under-
lying the theory. Recall that, in the signal-jamming
equilibrium, the incumbent adopts the same pricing
strategy whether he faces a high- or a low-quality en-
trant. Such anequilibriumissupportedbytheconsum-
ers’ (off-equilibrium) belief that immediate reaction in
terms of a sharp price cut by the incumbent would
mean that the entrant’s quality is high. In Experiment
2, we verify whether or not an incumbent’s response
to a new product entry with respect to a change in
price impacts consumers’ quality perceptions of the
entrant.
Subjects. Two pools of subjects were used. The
ﬁrst set comprised full-time MBA and evening MBA
students enrolled in a product management class. The
second setcomprisedundergraduatestudentsenrolled
in a marketing management class. The subjects were
asked to participate in a experiment pertaining to a
purchase decision task. Seventy-six graduate students
and 65 undergraduate students agreed to participate
in the experiment.
Methodology. A single factor between-subjects
design (price change) with three levels was employed.
The subjects were asked to assume the role of pur-
chasing agents in an organization. Speciﬁcally, they
were told that their job involved selecting suppliersfor
industrial components. Next, they were presented
with the purchase scenario. The scenario stated that
they had been buying a component from supplier X.
Further, supplier X’s quality had been rated by the
purchasing department to be 50 on a 100-point scale
(where 100 denoted excellent quality and 0 denoted very
poor quality). Supplier X had been charging the ﬁrm
$1,000 per component. The subjects were then told that
a supplier Y was entering the market with a competi-
tive component. The purchasing department would
have an opportunity to choose between the two sup-
pliers at the next purchase occasion. Finally, subjects
were told that they had just received a new price list
from the incumbent X. The manipulation involved the
change in X’s price: either a decrease to $700, an in-
crease to $1,300, or no change at $1,000.
Based on the information provided in the scenario,
the subjects were asked to state their quality percep-
tions of the new entrant on a 100-point scale (100 4
excellent quality; 0 4 very poor quality). They were also
asked an open-ended question to explain why they
thought the incumbent ﬁrm had responded by chang-
ing prices.
Results and Discussion. We examined the impact
of price response by the incumbent on the quality per-
ceptions of the entrant. The results were consistent
with the prediction that, relative to a price increase or
no price change, a price decrease by theincumbentwill
lead to more positive evaluations of the entrant’s qual-
ity. The results are summarized in Table 7. The results
for the undergraduates correspond very closely to
those found for the graduate subjects. For the graduate
pool, subjects who were given the incumbent price de-
crease condition judged the quality of the entrant more
favorably (Q 4 65.36) than the subjects who were
given the incumbent price increase condition (Q 4
47.24; F 4 12.38; p , 0.01) or the subjects who wereKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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given the incumbent no change condition (Q 4 52.80;
F 4 27.67; p , 0.01). Similarly, for the undergraduate
pool, the subjects exposed to the incumbent price de-
crease condition rated the entrant’s quality more fa-
vorably (Q 4 64.05) than the subjects who were ex-
posed to the incumbent price increase condition (Q 4
46.66; F 4 4.96; p , 0.05) or the subjects who were
exposed to the incumbent no change condition (Q 4
53.72; F 4 15.08; p , 0.01).
We also examined the responses to the open-ended
questions to conﬁrm whether the subjects interpreted
the competitive responses as revelation of private in-
formation held by the incumbent regarding the quality
of the new entrant. By and large, the stated rationales
provided conﬁrmatory evidence about the proposed
theory. The results are consistent with the notion that
competitive actions by an incumbent to new product
entries lead to quality inferences about the entrant.
Speciﬁcally, as compared with price increases or no
price changes, price decreases by the incumbent result
in higher quality perceptions of the entrant.
5. Conclusions
Responding to new product introductions is one of the
major strategic issues in marketing. Response time by
competitors is an important component of that strat-
egy. Though most normative models have implicitly
assumed or explicitly advocated quick competitive re-
actions (Hauser and Shugan 1983; Kumar and
Sudarshan 1988; Porter 1985), a number of empirical
studies have found that defensive reactions are often
delayed (Robinson 1988; Bowman and Gatignon 1995).
In this paper, we provide a rationale as to why a
delayed reaction may be the optimal strategy for an
incumbent ﬁrm. Previous explanationshavesuggested
that delayed responses result from either managerial
perceptions of a lack of potential threat from new
product introductions or a lack of managerial compe-
tence to respond quickly. We suggest that, under cer-
tain conditions, a delayed response may be an optimal
or efﬁcientstrategy whenthereisuncertaintyaboutthe
entrant’s quality. Succinctly, an immediate reaction in
the form of a lower price by the incumbent ﬁrm may
cause consumers to believe that the entrant’s product
quality is high. Therefore, an incumbent may be better
off by delaying the price response until consumers
learn the quality of the entrant’s product over time
through experience and word of mouth. We ﬁnd
strong experimental evidence supporting the under-
lying premise and explanation of our analysis.
The literature in marketing strategy hastraditionally
focused on either the impact of marketing actions on
consumers or the impact of the strategy on competitive
reactions (Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen 1989;
Hanssens 1980). In this paper, we highlight the impor-
tance of considering both the competitorsandconsum-
ers simultaneously in examining the incumbent ﬁrm’s
optimal reaction strategy. This approach becomes ex-
tremely important when consumersareabletoobserve
competitive actions or reactions. We acknowledge that
some reactions may be unobservable (e.g., trade pro-
motions) to consumers but believe that most actions
are detectable to both the competitors and consumers.
The managerial implications of this paper is that
well-established incumbent ﬁrms should be cautious
in the implementation of their defensive responses to
new product introductions of uncertain quality by
competitors. Of particular concern are situations
where the reactions are easily observable by consum-
ers. A strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent
takes the competitive threat seriously, leading con-
sumers to believe in the quality of the competitor’s
product.
We have shown that when the entrant uses price to
signal her quality, under certain conditions, it may be
optimal for the incumbent not to react aggressively in
the ﬁrst period.
20 The entrant can use other signals as
well. In addition to price,
21 the entrant has access to
other signaling instruments. For example, advertising
(Nelson 1974; Milgrom and Roberts 1986), umbrella
branding (Wernerfelt 1988), retailer reputation (Chu
and Chu 1994), product line selection (Balachander
and Srinivasan 1994), product upgrades
(Padmanabhan, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 1997), and
20Another explanation for the delayed reaction is that an incumbent
may be uncertain about the entrant’s ﬁnancial commitment/re-
sources. This issue needs further investigation. We thank Professor
Birger Wernerfelt for this observation.
21See Srinivasan (1991), Desai and Srinivasan (1995), and
Balachander and Srinivasan (1998) for other marketing analytical
models where price is the only signal instrument.KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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money-back guarantees (Moorthy and Srinivasan
1995) can also serve as signaling mechanisms for en-
trants. In future research work, we hope to examine




Proof of Lemma 1. Consider ﬁrst the case when qE , qI. In this case,
the demand functions for the entrant and the incumbent, for a given
set of prices pI and pE, are given by Equations (T1.2) and (T1.1),
respectively. It follows that
]Dp 1 pp EI EE 4` . 0, (A.1) 22 ]q (q 1 q ) q EI E E
as pE , pI for the entrant’s product to be undominated. Similarly,
]Dp 1 p IE I 4 , 0. (A.2) 2 ]q (q 1 q ) EI E
Now consider the case when qE . qI. In this case, the demand func-
tions for the entrant and the incumbent, for a given set of prices pI
and pE, are given by Equations (T1.4) and (T1.3), respectively. It fol-
lows that
]Dp 1 p EE I 4 . 0, (A.3) 2 ]q (q 1 q ) EI E
as pE . pI for the incumbent’s product to be undominated. Similarly,
]Dp 1 p IE I 41 , 0. (A.4) 2 ]q (q 1 q ) EI E
Proof of Lemma 2. Under monopoly,thedemandfunctionfacing
ﬁrm I is given by (p) 4 1 1 (p/qI), so that the incumbent’s proﬁt
PE DI
function is given by
2 pq 1 p 1 cq ` pc II I II II PE P 4 , (A.5) I qI
PE ]PI G [ q 1 2p ` c 4 0. (A.6) II I ]pI
G Solving (A.6) in pI yields the expression for the optimal pre-entry
price of the incumbent. N
22The authorsare listedinalphabeticalorderandcontributedequally
to the paper. We thank the acting editor, Rajiv Lal, the editor, Rick
Staelin, and three anonymous reviewers of this journalfortheircom-
ments. We thank the seminar participants at HKUST, Indian Insti-
tute of Management at Calcutta, University of Chicago, UCLA, and
UC at Berkeley for their comments. An earlier version of this work
was presented at the Marketing Science Conference at Sydney. This
work was partly supported by the Beatrice Companies Faculty Re-
search Fund (at the GSB, University of Chicago) to the second au-
thor. The usual disclaimer applies.
Proof of Proposition 1. The price competition between the in-
cumbent and the entrant when qE , qI is given by the following
program:
p 1 p IE P1: p* [ argmax P (p , p ) [ (p 1 c )1 1 , (A.7) II I E I I 34 q 1 q p IE I
qp1 qp EI IE p* [ argmax P (p , p ) [ (p 1 c ) . (A.8) EE I E E E 34 q (q 1 q ) p EI E E
The reaction functions for the incumbent and the entrant in this case
are given by:
]PI [ 2p 1 q ` q 1 p 1 c 4 0, (A.9) IIEEI ]pI
]PE [ 2qp 1 qp 1 cq 4 0. (A.10) IE EI EI ]pE
Solving the reaction functions simultaneously for pI and pE yieldsthe
Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium, viz. Equations (T3.1) and
(T3.2). N
Proof of Proposition 2. The price competition between the in-
cumbent and the entrant when qE :mt qI is given by the following
program:
qp 1 qp IE EI P2: p* [ argmax P (p , p ) [ (p 1 c ) , (A.11) II I E I I 34 q (q 1 q ) p IE I I
p 1 p EI p* [ argmax P (p , p ) [ (p 1 c )1 1 . (A.12) EE I E E E 34 q 1 q p EI E
The reaction functions for the incumbent and the entrant in this case
are given by
]PI [ 2qp 1 qp 1 cq 4 0, (A.13) EI IE IE ]pI
]PE [ 2p 1 q ` q 1 p 1 c 4 0. (A.14) EEIIE ]pE
Solving the reaction functions simultaneously for pI and pE yieldsthe
Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium, viz. Equations (T3.3) and
(T3.4). N
Proof of Proposition 3. The optimal pricing strategy for the
incumbent in the pre-entry period is given by
q ` c II PE p 4 , (A.15) I 2
where PE denotes the pre-entry period. In the post-entry period,
when consumers know the quality of the entrant’s product, the op-
timal pricing strategy of the incumbent is given by Equation (T3.3)
if qE . qI and by Equation (T3.1) if qI . qE. We ﬁrst formally show
that the incumbent’s post-entry price is less than the incumbent’s
pre-entry price.
First, consider the case when qE . qI. In this case,KALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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q ` c 2qc ` q (q 1 q ` c ) II E II EIE PE p 1 p* 41 II 24 q 1 q EI
q [2(q 1 c ) ` (q 1 c )] IE E I I 4 . 0, (A.16)
2(4q 1 q ) EI
as qE . cE and qI . cI. Note that qE is the highest consumer valuation
for the entrant’s product (corresponding to h 4 1) and hence qE .
pE . cE. By a similar logic, qI . pI . cI.
Similarly, when qE , qI,a sqE . cE and qI . cI, we have
q ` c 2q (q 1 q ) ` q (2c ` c ) II I IE I IE PE p 1 p* 41 II 24 q 1 q IE
2q (q 1 c ) ` q (q 1 c ) IE E EI I 4 . 0, (A.17)
2(4q 1 q ) EI
N
Proof of Proposition 4. The optimal proﬁt function of the H-type
entrant, when her perceived quality is q ˜E, can be written as
HH ,* HH H ,* ** P (q ˜ ) 4 [p (q ˜ ) 1 c ] 2 D [q ˜ , q , p (q ˜ ), p*(q ˜ )], (A.18) EE EE E EE I EEI E
where and are the optimal prices of the H-type entrant and
H,* pp * EI
the incumbent (as given in Proposition 1 when qE , qI and Propo-
sition 2 when qE . qI).
Now, by Envelope Theorem (Takayama 1988), we get
HH .* H ** dP [q ˜ , p (q ˜ ), p*(q ˜ )] ]P EEEE I E E 4 sign 34 3 4 dq ˜ ]q ˜ EE
H* ]DE 4 sign . 0. (by Lemma 2) 19) 34 ]q ˜E
G From (A.19), it follows that the proﬁt of the H-type entrant is
increasing in q ˜E. N
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that at the undistorted price of the
H-type entrant, any marginal increase in the entrant’s price hurtsthe
L-type’s proﬁt while it does not result in any ﬁrst-order loss for the
H-type. Further, as we show below, at any price above the optimal
(undistortedprice of theH-typeentrant,priceincreasecausesgreater
marginal loss to the L-type than the H-type entrant; price increase
causes greater marginal loss to the L-type than the H-type entrant;
this guarantees that “single crossing” or sorting condition is
satisﬁed.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case when so that the ex-
HL q . q . q , EEI
pected quality of the entrant (based on prior beliefs, q) is greater
than incumbent’s quality, i.e., q ˜E . qI. Note that to consider the mar-
ginal impact on the entrant’s proﬁt of increase in (pE), we have to
consider both the direct effect of pE and the indirect effect through
pI(PE). Substituting for pI(pE) from (A.13) in (A.12), we obtain the
expression for entrant’s proﬁt as a function of pE alone. Differenti-
ating w.r.t. pE, it can be shown that
]P (q ˜ , p ) q ˜ (2q ˜ 1 q 1 c ) 1 2p (2q ˜ ` q ) ` c (2q ˜ ` q ) E E I E EII E EI E EI 4 ,
]p 2q ˜ (q ˜ 1 q ) EE E I
(A.20)
and
2 ] P (q ˜ , p )2 q ˜ ` q ) EE I E I 4 . 0. (A.21)
]p ]c 2q ˜ (q ˜ 1 q ) EE EE I
which implies that
HH LL ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) ]q ˜ (q ˜ , p , c ) E EIE E EIE 1 . 0. (A.22)
]p ]p EE
But for any upward price distortion beyond the undistorted price of
the H-type incumbent, proﬁts decrease both for the H-type and the
L-type entrant. This, together with (A.22), implies that
HH LL ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) E EIE E EIE , . (A.23) )) )) ]p ]p EE
and since both and are of the same sign (i.e., neg-
HL ]P /]p ]P /]p EE EE
ative), we have
LL HH ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) * E EIE E EIE H G . for " p > p . (A.24) EE @ ]p ]p EE
Now consider the case qI . or equivalently qI q ˜E. Substituting
HL qq , EE
for pI(PE) from (A.9) in (A.8), we obtain the expression for entrant’s
proﬁt as a function of pE alone. Differentiating w.r.t. pE, it can be
shown that
]P (q ˜ , p ) q ˜ (q ˜ ` c ) 1 p ˜ ) 1 2p (2q 1 q ˜ ) ` c (2q 1 q ˜ ) EE I EI I E E I E E I E 4 ,
]p 2q ˜ (q 1 q ˜ ) EE I E
(A.25)
and
2 ] P (q ˜ , p )2 q 1 q ˜ ) EE I I E 4 . 0. (A.26)
]p ]c 2q ˜ (q 1 q ˜ ) EE EI E
which, following similar logic as above, implies that
LL HH ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) ]P (q ˜ , p , c ) * E EIE E EIE H G . 1 for " p > p . (A.27) EE @ ]p ]p EE
G From Equations (A.24) and (A.27), it follows that the L-type en-
trant incurs a higher marginal loss (resulting from an upward price
distortion) than the H-type entrant. N
Proof of Proposition 6. The optimal proﬁt function of the in-
cumbent, when the perceived quality of the H-type entrant is q ˜E, can
be written as
H,* P*(q ˜ ) 4 [p*(q ˜ ) 1 c ] 2 D*[q ˜ , q , p (q ˜ ), p*(q ˜ )]. (A.28) IE IE I IE I E E IE
where and are the optimal prices of the H-type entrant and
H,* pp * EI
the incumbent (as given in Proposition 1 when qE , qI and Propo-
sition 2 when qE . qI).
Now, by Envelope Theorem (Takayama 1988), we get
H.* dP*[q ˜ , p (q ˜ ), p*(q ˜ )] ]P* IE E E IE I G sign 4 sign 34 3 4 dq ˜ ]q ˜ EE
]D* I 4 sign , 0. (by Lemma 2) (A.29) 34 ]q ˜EKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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G From (A29), it follows that proﬁt of the incumbent is decreasing
in q ˜E.
The same logic holds in the case of the L-type entrant as well. We
omit details for brevity. N
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider ﬁrst the case when .
HL q . q EE
qI, so that q ˜E . qI. In this case, from Equation (A20), we have
LH L ]P ]P q ˜ (2q ˜ 1 q 1 c ) 1 2p (2q ˜ ` q ) ` c (2q ˜ ` q ) E E EE I I EE I EE I 4 , @ H ]p ]pq ˜ (2q ˜ 1 q 1 c ) 1 2p (2q ˜ ` q ) ` c (2q ˜ ` q ) E E EE I I EE I EE I
(A.30)
LH ]P ]P EE ]3 @ 4 ]p ]p EE
G4
]pE
HL 2(c 1 c )(2q ˜ ` q ) EE EI 1 , 0. H 2 [q ˜ (2q ˜ 1 q 1 c ) 1 2p (2q ˜ ` q ) ` c (2q ˜ ` q )] EE I I EE I EE I
(A.31)
G This implies that the H-type’s marginal ability to separate de-
creases at higher prices of the H-type entrant. Now, as noted earlier,
the reaction functions of the incumbent and the entrant are upward
sloping in their respective competitive prices because of strategic
complement effect (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984; Bulow,
Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 1985). This implies that by raising his
price, the incumbent forces the H-type entrant to raise her price but
at this level of H-type’s price, her marginal ability to separate is
lower. Thus, increasing pI implies reduced marginal ability to sepa-
rate for the H-type.
Similarly, in the case when qI . , or equivalently qI . q ˜E,
HL q . q EE
from Equation (A.25), we have
LH ]P ]P EE ]3 @ 4 ]p ]p EE
G4
]pE
HL 2(c 1 c )(2q ` q ˜ ) EE IE 1 , 0. H 2 [q ˜ (q ` c 1 q ˜ ) 1 2p (2q 1 q ˜ ) ` c (2q 1 q ˜ )] E IIE E IE E IE
(A.32)
G By a similar logic as above, it follows that increasing pI implies
reduced marginal ability to separate for the H-type. N
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider ﬁrst the case when qI . qE. Let
pI be any given price of the incumbent. Now, the options available
to the L-type entrant are: (1) to select her complete-informationprice,
(for the given pI), and be revealed as the L-type in which case
L,* pE
her perceived quality is ; or (2) to mimic the H-type by selecting
L qE
the H-type’s complete-information price, (for the given pI), and
H,* pE
“pool” in which case, since both the entrant types select the same
price, (for the given pI), her perceived quality is q ˜E.
H,* pE
Now, the L-type’s proﬁt when it “pools” with the H-type by se-
lecting (for the given pI) is given by
H,* pE
H,* q ˜p1 qp EI IE L,q H,* H P (p ) 4 (p 1 c ) , (A.33) EI E E 34 q ˜ (q 1 q ˜ ) EI E
while her proﬁt when she selects (for the given pI) and isrevealed
L,* pE
as the L-type is given by
LL ,* qp 1 qp EI IE L,L L,* H P (p ) 4 (p 1 c ) . (A.34) EI E E 34 LL q (q 1 q ) EI E
Let
H,* q ˜p1 qp EI IE L,q L,L H,* H D(p ) 4 P (p ) 1 P (p ) 4 (p 1 c ) IE IE IE E 34 q ˜ (q 1 q ˜ ) EI E
LL ,* qp 1 qp EI IE L,* H 1 (p 1 c ) . (A.35) EE 34 LL q (q 1 q ) EI E
Note that D(pI) measures the L-type’s gains from mimicking the H-
type and hence measures the L-type’s incentive to “pool” on quality.
H,* LL ,* L ]D p 1 cp 1 c EE E E G4 1 L ]pq 1 q ˜q 1 q II E I E
H,* LL ,* LL p (q 1 q ) 1 p (q 1 q ˜ ) 1 c (q ˜ 1 q ) EI E E I E E E E 4 . (A.36) L (q 1 q ˜ )(q 1 q ) IE IE
Note that q ˜E . . Let q ˜E 4` d with d . 0.
LL qq EE
H,* L,* LH ,* LL ,* LL ]D q (p 1 p ) 1 qp ` (q ` d)p 1 c (q ˜ 1 q ) IE E E E E E EE E G4 , L ]q (q 1 q ˜ )(q 1 q ) II E I E
(A.37)
LH ,* L,* L,* L ]D (q 1 q )(p 1 p ) ` d(p 1 c ) IE E E E E G4 . 0, (A.38) L ]q (q 1 q ˜ )(q 1 q ) II E I E
since qI . , , , and d . 0.
LH ,* L,* L,* L qp . pp. c EE E E E
Thus, the L-type’s incentive to “pool” on quality increases with
pI. N
Proof of Lemma 3. The mimicking constraint in Program P3,
Equation (T4.2), is given by
HH qp1 qp EI IE HL L ,* L (p 1 c ) # [p (p ) 1 c ] EE E I E 34 HH q (q 1 q ) EI E
LL ,* qp 1 qp (p ) EI IE I 2 , (A.39) 34 L q ˜ (q 1 q ) EI E
where (pI) is the complete information reaction function of the
L,* pE
L-type entrant and from Equation (3) is given by
LL qp ` cq EI EI L,* p (p ) 4 . (A.40) EI 2qI
Substituting (pI) in the Equation (T4.2), we obtain for the right-
L,* pE
hand side of the mimicking constraint, viz., the L-type’s proﬁt under
complete information reaction function, (pI), as
L,* PE
LL qp ` cq EI EI L qp 1 q EI I12 LL 2q qp` cq I EI EI L 1 c 2 E 34 L 2qq ˜ (q 1 q ) IE I E 3 4
LL 2 [qp1 cq] EI EI 4 , (A.41) LL 4qq(q 1 q ) IE I E
which is independent of . For notational simplicity, we denote
H pE
(pI)b yk. The Lagrangean for Program P3 is given by
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HH qp1 qp EI IE HH L 4 (p 1 c ) EE 34 HH q (q 1 q ) EI E
HH qp1 qp EI IE HL ` l (p 1 c ) 1 k . (A.42) IE E 33 4 4 HH q (q 1 q ) EI E
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
]L HH [ pq (1 ` l ) 1 2qp (1 ` l ) IE 1 IE 1 H ]pE
HL ` q (c ` l c ) 4 0, (A.43) IE 1 E
]L HL H H H H [ (p 1 c )(qp1 qp ) 1 kq (q 1 q ) 4 0, (A.44) EE E II E E IE ]l1
]L ]L HH p 4 0, l 4 0, p $ 0, l # 0. (A.45) E 1 E 1 H ]p ]l E 1
At the least-cost quality separation, the mimicking constraint of the
L-type entrant is binding, which implies that lI , 0. Solving (A.43)
for , we get
H pE
HH L pq (1 ` l ) ` q (c ` l c ) IE 1 IE 1 E H p 4 . (A.46) E 2q (1 ` l ) I 1
Further, the second-order optimality condition requires that the
second-derivative of the Lagrangean be negative. Thus
2 ] L
[ 12q (1 ` l ) , 0 Û l . 11. (A.47) 2 I 11 H ]pE
Substituting from (A.46) in (A.44), we get
H pE
2 HL 2 HH l [(qp1 cq) 1 4kq q (q 1 q )] 1 EI E I EI I E
HL 2 HH ` 2l [(qp1 cq) 1 4kq q (q 1 q )] 1 EI E I EI I E
HL2 HH HH H H `[2ccq 1 (qp` cq )(cq1 qp ) 1 4kq q (q 1 q ) EEI EI EI EI EI EI I E
HL 1 2pqq c] 4 0, (A.48) IIEE
which is a quadratic equation in lI of the form ` bl1 ` c 4 0,
2 al1
where
HL 2 HH a 4 2b 4 (qp1 cq) 1 4kq q (q 1 q ), (A.49) EI E I EI I E
and
HL2 HH HH c 4 2ccq 1 (qp` cq )(cq1 qp ) EEI EI EI EI EI
HH H L 1 4kq q (q 1 q ) 1 2pqq c. (A.50) EI I E IIEE
Solving for lI, using the formula
2 1b 5 b 1 4ac ! a 1 c
l 44 1 1 5 ({{ b 4 2a), (A.51) 1 { ! 2aa
we get
l 41 1 5 I
HL 2 HH HH H L 2 HL (qp1 cq) ` (qp` cq )(cq1 qp ) 1 2ccq` 2pqq c EI E I EI EI EI EI EE I I I EE . HL 2 HH ! (qp1 cq) 1 4kq q (q 1 q ) EI E I EI I E
(A.52)
But since lI . 11, to be consistent with the second-order condition,
the desired expression for lI is
l 41 1 ` I




Differentiating l1({) with respect to pI, we have
]l1 41
]pI
HH L H L qq (c 1 c )[pq 1 qc] IE E E IE IE , 0. (A.54)
2 2 2 HH L H H L 3/2 {pq 1 2pq qc ` q [4kq (q 1 q ) ` qc ]} I E IE IE I E E I IE
This is so due to the following reason: Note that from Equations
(A.40) and (A.41), . 0, otherwise the L-type entrant’s
LL pq 1 qc IE IE
equilibrium demand as well as per unit contribution margin under
complete information is negative. Since , it follows that
HL q . q EE
. 0. This completes the proof of the ﬁrst claim.
HL pq 1 qc IE IE
Now, under complete information when qI .. , the H-type
HL qq EE
entrant’s reaction function is given by Equation (A.10), i.e.,
HH qp` cq EI EI H,* p (p ) 4 , (A.55) EI 2qI
so that
H,* H ]pq EE 4 .
]p 2q II
Furthermore, from Equation (A.46), the H-type entrant’s least-cost
separating reaction function under quality signaling is given by
HH L qp (1 ` l ) ` q (c ` l c ) QS EI 1 IE 1 E H p (p ) 4 [ n(p , l (p )), (A.56) EI I 1 I 2q (1 ` l ) I 1
so that
QS H ]p ]n ]n ]l E 1 4`2. (A.57)
]p ]p ]l ]p II 1 I
Now, we have
H ]n qE 4 , (A.58)
]p 2q II
HL ]n c 1 c EE 41 , 0, (A.59)
]l 2(1 ` l ) 11
and Equation (A.54) gives the expression for ]l1/]pI. Thus, using
Equations (A.54)–(A.59), we haveKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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QS HH ]p ]p ,* ]n ]l EE 1 1 424
]p ]p ]l ]p II 1 I
HH L 2 HL qq (c 1 c )[ pq 1 qc] IE E I E I E E




Proofs of Lemma 5 and Proposition 9. We ﬁrst derive the re-
action function of the incumbent under signal-jamming for any an-
ticipated price of the H-type entrant. (Of course, in the equilib-
H pE
rium, this will coincide with the actual price selected by the H-type.)
The Lagrangean corresponding to P38 is given by
H 2 H p (q 1 q ˜ ` p ` c ) 1 p 1 c (q 1 q ˜ ` p ) II E E I I II E E L 4
q 1 q ˜ IE
2 2 HH 2 H 22LL H pq 1 2pqc qc (1 ` 2l ) 1 l qc(c 1 2c ) IE II E IE 11 IE E E ` l ` 23 HH H 2 4q (q 1 q )4 qq (q 1 q )(1 ` l ) II E E II E 1
2 HH H H H q ˜p (p 1 c ) 1 qp ` qc p EI E E IE IEE 1 . 4 q ˜ (q 1 q ˜ ) EI E
(A.61)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
HH H ]Lq 1 q ˜ ` p ` c 1 2p 1 l (p 1 c ) IEEI I2 EE 4
]pq 1 q ˜ II E
HH l [pq 1 qc ] 2 IE IE `4 0, (A.62) H 2q (q 1 q ) II E
2 HH ]Lp q 1 2pqc IE II E 4 H ]l 4q (q 1 q ) 2 II E
2 2 H 22LL H qc (1 ` 2l ) 1 l qc(c 1 2c ) IE 11 IE E E ` HH 2 4qq (q 1 q )(1 ` l ) EI I E 1
2 HH H H H q ˜p (p 1 c ) 1 qp ` qc p EI E E IE IEE 14 0, (A.63)
q ˜ (q 1 q ˜ ) EI E
]L ]L
p 4 0, l 4 0, p $ 0, l # 0. (A.64) I 2 I 2 ]p ]l I 2
At the most efﬁcient (i.e., at least cost to the incumbent), the signal-
jamming constraint of the H-type is binding, which implies that l2
, 0. Solving (A.62) for pI, we get the signal-jamming reaction func-
tion of the incumbent as
H 2p 1 c ` q ˜ 1 c 1 q IE EII
HH q (q 1 q ˜ ) c EI E E H 1 l ` p `4 0. (A.65) 2 E 34 H 2q (q 1 q )2 II E
Furthermore, the second-order optimalityconditionrequiresthatthe
second-derivative of the Lagrangean be negative. Thus,
2 H ] L 2 l q 2 E 41 ` 2 H ]pq 1 q ˜ 2q (q 1 q ) II E I I E
H 4q (q 1 q ) II E , 0 Û l , . (A.66) 2 H q (q 1 q ˜ ) EI E
Note that since the right-hand side of (A.66) is a positive number
and the Lagrangean multiplier l2 , 0, the second-order condition is
always satisﬁed at the maximum.
The signal-jamming equilibrium prices are the pair of prices ^pI,
pE& that simultaneously satisfy the reaction functions (A.46) and
(A.65). (Note that using the general form of the Implicit Function
Theorem (Simon and Blume 1994, pp. 350–358), it can be shown that
such a solution exists.)
This signal-jamming equilibrium is supported by the off-
equilibrium beliefs pI ? Þ q 4 1 and/or pE ? Þ q 4 0. Note
SJ SJ pp IE
that we need to consider the out-of-equilibrium belief for any uni-
lateral deviation by either the incumbent or the entrant. In our
model, ﬁrms select prices simultaneously and noncooperatively.
Hence, joint or coordinated defections are not relevant and, thus, the
speciﬁcation of our beliefs. Note that these off-equilibrium beliefs
satisfy intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). For defection to
higher than signal-jamming prices by the incumbent intuitive crite-
rion does not impose any restriction. Neither the incumbent facing
a true high-type entrant nor the incumbent facing the true low-type
entrant will defect to such higher prices. A similar reasoning holds
for upward defection for either type entrant (technical details have
been omitted for brevity and are available from the authors on
request).
Now consider deviations below the signal-jamming prices. Note
that is above the complete-information price of the incumbent
SJ pI
(either when entrant is H-o rL-type). Hence, under the most favor-
able consumer beliefs (i.e., it is the L-type entrant), by deviating
downwards, the incumbent can increase his proﬁts (both when the
entrant is H- and L-type). Thus, intuitive criterion cannot reﬁne this
off-equilibrium belief. Similarly, note that is higher than the com-
SJ pE
plete information price of both the H- and L-type entrants. Hence,
under the most favorable consumer beliefs (i.e., it is the H-type en-
trant), by deviating downwards, both the H- and L-type entrants can
increase their proﬁts. Thus, again in this case, the intuitive criterion
cannot reﬁne this off-equilibrium belief.
In summary, the beliefssupportingthefocalsignal-jammingequi-
librium are sustained by the intuitive criterion. Any equilibria en-
tailing higher than the signal-jamming prices for either the incum-
bent or the entrant can be ruled out by application of elimination of
dominated strategies (Moulin 1979). Now consider any price lower
than the signal-jamming equilibrium as a candidate pooling equilib-
rium. This can only be sustained withthebeliefat anyotherentrant’s
price, the type is low. Now that the incumbent’s price is lower than
the signal-jamming price, the high-quality entrant can separate at
the signal-jamming price. (Only to prevent this, the incumbent
chooses to jam the signal in the ﬁrst place, as derived in our focal
analysis.) Given such a separation, the high-type will defect, while
the low-type will not. Therefore, the only “reasonable” belief sup-
ported by intuitive criterion is that the entrant’s type is high. SuchKALRA, RAJIV, AND SRINIVASAN
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a belief, however, overturns the suggested pooling equilibrium. Ex-
tending the logic, any pooling equilibria with prices lower than the
signal-jamming equilibrium prices can be eliminated. Thus, we es-
tablish that the focal signal-jamming pooling equilibrium is unique.
N
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